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Abstract
This paper presents a novel model of the lending process that takes into account
that loan oﬃcers must spend time and eﬀort to originate new loans. Besides gen-
erating predictions on loan oﬃcers’ compensation and its interaction with the loan
review process, the model sheds light on why competition could lead to excessively
low lending standards. We also show how more intense competition may fasten the
adoption of credit scoring. More generally, hard-information lending techniques such
as credit scoring allow to give loan oﬃcers high-powered incentives without compro-
mising the integrity and quality of the loan approval process. The model is ﬁnally
applied to study the implications of loan sales on the adopted lending process and
lending standard.
∗I thank seminar participants at Bergen, Duke, Mannheim, the University of North Carolina, and the
ECB for helpful comments.
†University of Frankfurt (IMFS) and London School of Economics. E-mail: inderst@ﬁnance.uni-
frankfurt.de.
11 Introduction
This paper develops a simple model of the loan-origination process that explicitly takes
into account that loan oﬃcers must spend time and eﬀort to generate new loan applica-
tions. The model allows to derive new implications on the determinants of banks’ lending
standard and the adoption of hard-information lending techniques such as credit scoring.
We ﬁnd that so as to mitigate their internal agency problem vis-á-vis loan oﬃcers, banks
have a tendency to implement too low lending standards, if judged solely by the NPV of
newly made loans. The adopted lending standard further decreases under more intense
competition, leading to a further deterioration of the average quality of the loan portfolio.
The model also suggests that more competition triggers a switch from soft- to hard-
information lending, as this allows to give loan oﬃcers more high-powered incentives with-
out compromising the integrity and quality of the loan approval process. While it has been
frequently observed that the switch to hard-information lending intensiﬁes competition as
it reduces the importance of closeness to the borrower, the present model thus suggests a
reverse causality.1 This novel perspective may help to explain why the adoption of credit
scoring to commercial lending seems not to have gathered pace equally across countries.2
At the heart of this paper is a novel model of the loan-origination process. In the case
of soft-information lending, the loan oﬃcer has two tasks to perform: ﬁrstly, to spend time
and eﬀo r to nc o n t a c t i n gc l i e n t ss oa st og e n e r a t en e wl o a no p p o r t u n i t i e s ; 3 secondly, to
feed his "soft" information into the loan-approval process. The second task has been much
discussed in the literature on relationship lending and entails two key assumptions: that
the loan oﬃcer has privileged access to information about the borrowing ﬁrm and that
some of this information is “soft” i.e., “hard to quantify, verify and communicate through
1Such a shrinking distance between lenders and small-business borrowers has been documented for the
US by, for instance, Petersen and Rajan (2002). For a contrasting European perspective based on Belgian
data see, however, Degryse and Ongena (2005).
2See Berger and Frame (2005) for a detailed account of the spread of small business credit scoring
in the US, as well as Akhavein et al. (2001) for a quantitative analysis. Clearly, the evolution of credit
scoring also depends crucially on developments in IT, as a main beneﬁt lies in the lower costs of processing
applications. Though this should equally apply to Europe, in their detailed analysis of the small business
loan data from a large Belgian bank, Degryse, Laeven, and Ongena (2006) note that credit scoring was
virtually non-existing in the late 90s.
3For instance, the loan oﬃcer may inquire in regular intervals about a client’s needs to expand existing
credit facilities or to extend existing services, say cash management, into lending. For more aggressive
banks, it may also involve active prospecting for new clients.the normal transmission channels of a banking organization” (Berger and Udell, 2002).4 In
contrast to the extensive treatment of the role of soft information, the ﬁrst task in the loan
origination process, i.e., the task of originating new loan applications in the ﬁrst place,
has been largely ignored in the literature. We ﬁnd that the interaction of the two tasks
under soft-information lending may bias the loan oﬃcer towards “overlending”. This bias
does not arise from collusion with the borrower.5 Instead, the bias arises endogenously
under the optimal compensation scheme. To counter this bias, the bank must monitor the
performance of loan oﬃcers and it may have to reward better performing loan oﬃcers with
higher “rents”.6
With hard-information lending, which is the second lending regime that we study, the
loan oﬃcer no longer plays an active role at the loan approval stage, apart from keying in
the hard and veriﬁable information about the loan applicant.7 The loan oﬃcer´s incentives
can thus be fully directed towards the single objective of originating new loan-making
opportunities.8 The loan oﬃcer’s role is then reduced to that of a salesperson. As we will
argue, this may be part of a bank’s strategy to more aggressively pursue opportunities in
new markets, while for other banks this may simply be necessary to defend its home turf
against increasing competition.
4On more details on the deﬁnition of soft information see Petersen (2004). In our model, the loan
oﬃcer could well be asked to provide some (ordinal) information about more qualitative factors. Also,
some of these factors may be veriﬁable, albeit only at additional costs through the bank’s review process.
5On the potential for collusion see Udell (1989) and Berger and Udell (2002), as well as more recently
Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisni (2006).
6While nowadays a bank routinely reviews its whole loan portfolio to comply with regulatory require-
ments, the extent to which a given rating is further scrutinized internally remains still at the bank’s
discretion. As noted by Treacy and Carey (1998), in their interviews conducted with large banks “[...]
managers indicated that the internal rating system is at least partly designed to promote and maintain
the overall credit culture.[...] Strong review processes aim to identify and discipline relationship man-
agers [...].” Udell (1989) provides evidence that banks invest more in monitoring when more authority is
delegated to loan oﬃcers, which further testiﬁes to its disciplining role.
7Most notably, Stein (2002) has also looked into the organizational “black box” of banks’ lending
processes, albeit with a focus on the internal capital market operated in large banks. He shows how
incentives for local staﬀ to generate information can be undermined if this information cannot be com-
municated to headquarters due to its soft and subjective nature. On the theoretical side, our model of
the double-task problem borrows also from Inderst and Ottaviani (2007). There, the focus is, however,
on public policy to prevent the (mis-)selling of expert goods through agents.
8We conceive here that the adoption of credit scoring does more than just providing the loan oﬃcer
with a new tool, but that it coincides with a fundamental change in the lending regime. Consequently, at
the point of switching to hard-information lending the informativeness of the lending decision decreases
as soft information is discarded. This contrasts our analysis to that in Hauswald and Marquez (2003),
who have studied how borrowing conditions are aﬀected as banks become more eﬃcient in generating or
using information.
3For instance, according to James and Houston (1996) Wells Fargo has since the 80s
rolled out credit scoring by sending out its agents “armed with a laptop computer [...] to
"plug in" the borrower’s information into the computer model — and, in many cases, to
approve loans on the spot." More lately, Wells Fargo has even proceeded towards delegating
the origination of loans to community banks, which use Wells Fargo’s proprietary system
and are paid a fee per loan (see Berger and Frame, 2005). While a loan origination system
that enlists other banks’ employees may be rare in commercial lending,9 the job description
of loan oﬃcers by the US Department of Labor suggests that by now commercial loan
oﬃcers are indeed often treated like salespeople and receive a substantial fraction of their
pay through commissions or loan-origination fees:10
“In many instances, loan oﬃcers act as salespeople. Commercial loan oﬃ-
cers, for example, contact ﬁrms to determine their needs for loans. If a ﬁrm is
seeking new funds, the loan oﬃcer will try to persuade the company to obtain
the loan from his or her institution. [...] The form of compensation for loan of-
ﬁcers varies. Most are paid a commission that is based on the number of loans
they originate. In this way, commissions are used to motivate loan oﬃcers to
bring in more loans. Some institutions pay only salaries, while others pay their
loan oﬃcers a salary plus a commission or bonus based on the number of loans
originated.”
T h em o d e ls u g g e s t st h a tl o a no ﬃcers who still have the twin roles of originating new
loan opportunities and of feeding “soft” information into the approval process will have
less high-powered incentives and are thus paid more like bureaucrats. Loan oﬃcers are
also paid more like salespeople and less like bureaucrats as competition increases.
When a bank wants to or simply has to step up the incentives of its loan oﬃcers under
increasing competition, this makes a switch to hard-information lending more proﬁtable.
As noted above, the literature has, instead, focused on the opposite causality, as credit
scoring creates competition also from more distant banks. Taken together, the two hy-
9As stated in more detail below, the focus of this paper will be squarely on commercial and not on
retail lending, and especially not mortgage lending. Though these areas of banking share similar issues
that are also touched upon in this paper, we do not aspire to capture institutional details of retail lending,
let alone of the US (subprime) mortgage market.
10See http://www.bls.gov/oco/ocos018.htm
4potheses jointly suggest a strong complementarity between competition and the adoption
of hard-information lending techniques.
In our model, when the bank increases its loan oﬃcers’ incentives to generate loans,
it optimally lowers the applied lending standard. The intuition is the following. When
the bank’s compensation scheme puts a higher reward on loan making, loan oﬃcers’ own
incentives to approve loans—or, likewise, to inﬂuence the bank’s approval decision in this
way—increase. While the bank could fully counteract this with a more thorough loan review
process, optimally it will only partially do so. In fact, the "marginal" loan that is made
under the bank’s chosen lending standard will always have negative expected NPV. With
more competition the set of negative-NPV loans widens.11 If this is due to the opening of
a market to new entrants, then in contrast to the extant literature (cf. Bofondi and Gobbi
2004), which has focused on the lemons’ problem of entrants, the present model would
predict that also the incumbents’ default rate increases.12
Though this link is not explicitly formalized in the model, it has been suggested that
there is more competition during booms.13 Our model would thus predict an excessive
relaxation of lending standards in booms (cf. Asea and Blomberg 1998 or Lown and
Morgan 2004). Previous work has associated this with organizational inertia (Berger and
Udell 2004) or a more general misperception of changes in risk (Borio, Furﬁne, and Lowe
2001). Furthermore, countercyclical standards arise in Rajan (1994) from a model where
bank managers can better hide losses when most borrowers do well and in Ruckes (2004),
as well as Weinberg (1995), from an optimal adjustment of screening intensity.14
11While the present model explicitly closes down the interest rate channel, through which competition
could aﬀect loan performance, some of the extant theory would suggest the opposite implication for
default rates: As competition brings down the loan rate, this would either attract borrowers with a more
creditworthy project or, through leaving borrowers with a larger stake in their own venture, induce more
eﬀort and thus on average a higher probability of success (cf. Stiglitz and Weiss 1981 and Boyd and De
Nicolo 2005).
12At this point, our paper ties in with the large literature that tries to establish, both theoretically and
empirically, a relationship between market structure and stability in banking. Though a number of papers
has suggested that various proxies of more intense competition are negatively correlated with banking
stability, this view is not uniformly shared (cf. most recently the discussion in Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and
Levine 2006).
13That competition intensiﬁes during booms has been suggested based on the documented reduction
in banks’ margins as well as borrowers’ credit spreads (cf. Dueker and Thornton, 1997; Corvoisier and
Gropp, 2002). Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006) suggest that an increase in competition could be due to
a reduction in adverse selection between banks, given that a boom brings in new borrowers. They show
that this may induce banks to no longer screen borrowers by requiring collateral.
14There is also a small theoretical literature that jointly endogenizes business cycle conditions and
changes in the pool of funded projects and thus the likelihood of future default. For instance, in Suarez
5Sections 2-6 analyze how, under the optimal compensation scheme for loan oﬃcers,
the bank optimally chooses both its lending standard and its loan-making technology.
While our focus is on the role of competition, the analysis generates also some additional,
more immediate implications on other determinants of the choice of the bank’s lending
technology, e.g., the informativeness of credit scoring. While in Sections 2-5 it is presumed
for tractability that the loan oﬃcers’ eﬀort choice is discrete, Section 6 extends the model
to continuous eﬀort.
In Section 7 we use the modelling framework to generate additional implications.
Amongst other things, the model is used to analyze the implications of loan-selling on
both the applied lending standard and the chosen lending technology. We ﬁnd that as
more loans are sold oﬀ, the quality of loans deteriorates both as this accelerates the switch
to hard-information lending and as the implemented standard is lower. We also discuss
how the bank would optimally invest in its loan review process and how its internal em-
ployment relationship should interact with the adopted lending technology and lending
standard.
Section 8 concludes. All proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 The Model
Lending Technology
We focus ﬁrst on the soft-information lending regime, where the loan oﬃcer has to perform
two tasks. The ﬁrst task is to generate new loan applications. Here, the main analysis
considers the most simple discrete-choice model and thus stipulates that the loan oﬃcer can
exert a given level of eﬀo r ta tp r i v a t ed i s u t i l i t yc>0 or no eﬀo r ta ta l l .E ﬀort generates a
loan application with probability π>0. Without exerting eﬀort the respective probability
is zero. All agents in our model a risk neutral, while the loan oﬃcer has limited liability.
There are two types of borrowers: low types θ = l and high types θ = h.T h eex-ante
probability that a borrower is of the high type equals 0 <μ<1. A borrower of type θ
defaults with probability 1 − pθ,w h e r e0 ≤ pl <p h ≤ 1, in which case the bank obtains a
zero repayment. Otherwise, the bank receives a contractually stipulated repayment of R.
Letting k denote the initial loan size, the NPV from the loan is vθ := pθR−k. We stipulate
and Sussmann (1997) lower margins in the boom create more need for external ﬁnance, which through a
moral hazard problem triggers more risk taking and thus a higher probability of future default.
6that vh > 0 >v l. Normalizing the risk-free rate to zero, from the bank’s perspective it
is thus only proﬁtable to lend to high-type borrowers. Finally, it is not proﬁtable to
indiscriminately grant a loan to all borrowers as v := μvh +( 1− μ)vl < 0.
By using his soft information, the loan oﬃcer can make a more informed decision.
Suppose thus that the loan oﬃcer can privately observe a signal s ∈ [0,1], which is realized
according to the type-dependent distribution function Ψθ. Signals are ordered such that
Ψh dominates Ψl according to the Monotone Likelihood Ratio property. With continuous
densities satisfying ψh(1) > 0, ψl(0) > 0,a n dψh(0) = ψl(1) = 0, the signal is also fully
informative at the boundaries.
The ex-post probability with which the borrower is of the high type is given by
μ(s): =P r [ θ = h | s]=
μψh(s)
μψh(s)+( 1− μ)ψl(s)
,
which is strictly increasing in s. Next, the conditional success probability is given by
p(s): =μ(s)ph +[ 1− μ(s)]pl, such that the conditional NPV of making a loan equals
v(s): =p(s)R − k. This is continuous and strictly increasing in s.T o g e t h e rw i t hv(0) =
vl < 0 and v(1) = vh > 0, we then have a unique (and from the bank’s perspective ﬁrst-best
optimal) threshold 0 <s FB < 1 where v(sFB)=0 .
In what follows, it will be convenient to express the bank’s optimization program by
working with the conditional values p(s) (for the probability of repayment) and v(s) (for
the expected NPV) together with the ex-ante distribution over the signal s,w h i c hi sg i v e n
by G(s) with density g(s): =μψh(s)+( 1− μ)ψl(s).
Loan Oﬃcer Compensation
If the loan oﬃcer was paid like a bureaucrat with a ﬁxed wage w, his preferences at the
loan approval stage would be aligned with those of the bank.15 (Precisely, the loan oﬃcer
would then always be indiﬀerent.) The crux, however, is that if the loan oﬃcer was paid
like a bureaucrat, he would have no incentives to originate a new loan in the ﬁrst place.
Neither the signal s nor the time and eﬀo r tt h a tt h el o a no ﬃcer spends on the origi-
nation of new loans are observable by his principal, the bank. Realistically, it is also not
feasible to remunerate the loan oﬃcer on the basis of the number of ﬁlled-in applications,
15If observing s required to exert costly eﬀort, then under a ﬁxed-wage contract there would not be any
incentives to acquire soft information in the ﬁrst place. It can be shown that the following results would
go through if next to the cost of originating a loan, c, additional eﬀort at cost b c was necessary to acquire
information.
7which could simply be bogus applications. A compensation scheme can thus only be made
contingent on whether a new loan was approved or not.
Before setting up the general compensation scheme, it should be noted that we can
suppose without loss of generality that the approval decision is delegated to the loan oﬃcer.
That is, it is straightforward to show that this implements the optimal mechanism.16
Furthermore, another instrument that the bank has at its disposal is the loan review
process, through which the loan oﬃcer’s approval decisions are monitored. For this we
stipulate that with probability m the bank observes early on whether the borrower will
subsequently default.17
Taken together, in this environment the diﬀerent states on which a compensation con-
tract can condition are thus the following: ﬁrst, the state where a loan has not been made;
second, the state where a loan has been made and where no negative information was
obtained in the loan review process; and ﬁnally the state where a loan has been made
and where negative information was subsequently revealed. It is immediate that in the
ﬁnal case, given limited liability of the loan oﬃcer, it is optimal to set the loan oﬃcer’s
wage equal to zero (the limited liability constraint). This leaves us with two wage levels
to specify. We refer to the wage that is paid if no loan was made as the base wage w.
Otherwise, a loan-origination fee f is paid in addition to w.18
Discussion
Before proceeding to the analysis, we comment on the chosen speciﬁcations. We already
discussed the role of the loan review process in the Introduction. As m<1 holds, it is
immediate that the bank would want to withhold any payment to the loan oﬃcer until it
receives itself full payment from the borrower, which provides an additional signal of the
16A general mechanism is described by a standard message-game approach, by which the bank would
specify a mapping of the loan oﬃcer’s message b s ∈ [0,1] into the space of contracts and decisions. Loan
oﬃcers with strong relationships often seem to indeed enjoy a high level of discretion (cf. the case described
in Hertzberg, Liberti, and Paravisni 2006). This holds despite the fact that due to regulatory requirements
loan approvals regularly have to be co-signed by the bank’s risk management side.
17All that is important for our analysis is that some information is received, irrespective of how noisy
it is and irrespective of whether it relates directly to the borrower’s type θ or, as presently speciﬁed, to
subsequent default.
18Note that it is not possible to separately verify whether no negative information was obtained as
the particular loan was not reviewed with the necessary scrutiny or whether it was reviewed but the
information was positive. Otherwise, it would be optimal to "load" all of the fee on the state where a
loan review was performed and revealed positive information. To ensure that then still all of the following
results hold, we would need to assume that the loan review process is noisy. (Presently, we assume for
simplicity that it perfectly reveals θ.)
8type θ. This may, however, lie too far in the future to be of much use for disciplining the
loan oﬃcer.19 Based on this observation, one may equally doubt that all of the promised
wage payment, w + f,m a yb ef o r f e i t e db yal o a no ﬃcer in case of a negative outcome of
the loan review process. Our results extend, however, to the case where only a fraction
α>0 of w + f can be withheld or “clawed back”. In fact, the comparative analysis in α
would then be completely analogous to that of a change in m.
Finally, note that in Section 7 we allow the bank to choose both the compensation
contract as well as the optimal intensity of its loan review process, m.
3L o a n O ﬃcers’ Incentives
We currently suppose that the loan oﬃcer performs two tasks for the bank: that of orig-
inating new loan-making opportunities and that of using his only privatively observed
information so as to allow the bank to make more informed approval decisions. In what
follows, we derive ﬁrst the respective incentive constraints.
Suppose ﬁr s tt h a tt h el o a no ﬃcer has already generated a new loan application. In
case the loan is not approved, the loan oﬃcer realizes only his base wage w. Otherwise,
his wage depends on the outcome of the subsequent loan review process. After observing
the signal s and approving a borrower, the loan oﬃcer can expect that with aggregate
probability 1−m+mp(s) no negative information will subsequently be revealed. (We use
here that a loan review will only generate information with probability m and that the
conditional success probability is p(s).) Consequently, the loan oﬃcer prefers to approve
a loan only when
[1 − m + mp(s)](w + f) ≥ w. (1)
If he loan oﬃcer prefers to approve a loan for some signal s<1, then he will strictly do
so for all higher signals s0 >s . From optimality for the bank, we can safely rule out the
cases where a loan is never or always approved. Taken together, there is thus an interior
19The insight that it may be beneﬁcial to withhold wages or, in addition, have workers post a bond
until more of the uncertainty surrounding the choice of eﬀort has been resolved is not novel. Incidentally,
in the area of consumer loans to high-risk borrowers (e.g., the case of “doorstep lending” in the UK) it is
sometimes observed that loan oﬃcers are indeed paid exclusively out of the collections that they personally
make from borrowers.
9threshold 0 <s ∗ < 1 at which the loan oﬃcer is just indiﬀerent, such that from (1)
f
w
=
m[1 − p(s∗)]
1 − m[1 − p(s∗)]
. (2)
Suppose that the bank wants to change the implemented threshold s∗.A st h er i g h t -
hand side of condition (2) is strictly decreasing in s∗, to obtain a stricter standard s∗
the ratio f/w must decrease. Hence, a stricter standard has to go together with a more
low-powered compensation scheme. Furthermore, the right-hand side of (2) is strictly
increasing in m. Intuitively, if the loan review process is more informative, a lower base
wage w is suﬃcient to ensure that the loan oﬃcer follows a given standard s∗.
We turn next to the loan oﬃcer’s second incentive constraint, which ensures that new
loan-making opportunities are created in the ﬁrst place. When exerting eﬀort at private
cost c,t h el o a no ﬃcer ﬁnds an interested applicant with probability π.C o n s e q u e n t l y ,
from an ex-ante perspective a loan will only be made with probability π[1 − G(s∗)].U s i n g
also that the loan oﬃcer earns the base wage w without a loan and that he forfeits all
compensation in case the loan review reveals negative information about an approved loan,
we obtain that exerting costly eﬀort is only optimal if
Z 1
s∗
[[1 − m + mp(s)](w + f) − w]g(s)ds ≥ D :=
c
π
. (3)
To incentivize the loan oﬃcer to exert eﬀo r t ,t h e r em u s tt h u sb eas u ﬃciently large wedge
between the expected compensation in case of making a loan (for all s ≥ s∗)a n dt h e
base wage w, which is paid even when no loan was made. The additional (expected)
compensation must be larger the harder it is to generate a new application, as expressed
by D.
For given s∗, the bank chooses (w,f) to maximize ex-ante proﬁts
Π = π
Z 1
s∗
[ν(s) − [1 − m + mp(s)](w + f)]g(s)ds − w[πG(s
∗)+( 1− π)], (4)
which takes into account both the conditional NPV from the loan, ν(s), and the expected
wage payment. The optimal contract is straightforward to derive and uniquely character-
ized by constraint (1) and the binding incentive constraint (3).
Proposition 1 The optimal contract for a given threshold s∗ speciﬁes a base wage
w =
D
m
"
1 − m[1 − p(s∗)]
R 1
s∗ [p(s) − p(s∗)]f(s)ds
#
(5)
10and a loan-origination fee
f = D
"
1 − p(s∗)
R 1
s∗ [p(s) − p(s∗)]f(s)ds
#
. (6)
That constraint (3) must be binding, which is what we used for the characterization
in Proposition 1, follows immediately from the fact that the base wage w represents a
pure rent for the loan oﬃcer. Intuitively, this follows as the loan oﬃcer could earn w even
without exerting eﬀort. The loan oﬃcer’s total expected compensation is thus equal to
w +c,w i t hw characterized in (5). Next, from diﬀerentiating (5) and (6), respectively, we
obtain the following results.
Corollary 1 In order to implement a higher lending standard s∗, the bank has to pay
both a higher base wage w and a higher loan-origination fee f. Still, the higher s∗ the
ﬂatter becomes the compensation scheme as f/w decreases. On the other hand, a more
informative loan review process is, for given s∗, associated with a steeper compensation
scheme.
Note that from Corollary 1 the two incentive instruments, namely the steepness of the
compensation scheme and the loan review process, are complementary: A higher monitor-
ing intensity is associated with a steeper incentive scheme. To derive implications for the
loan oﬃcer’s compensation scheme we must, however, ﬁrst solve for the bank’s optimally
chosen level of s∗.
4 Lending Standard
Substituting the optimal compensation scheme from Proposition 1 into the bank’s objective
function (4), we obtain
Π = π
Z 1
s∗
ν(s)g(s)ds − (c + w), (7)
which is the expected proﬁt from lending minus the expected wage bill, c + w. Hence,
holding the wage bill constant, from an ex-ante perspective it would clearly be optimal
to set s∗ = sFB, thereby ensuring that loans are made if and only if they represent a
positive-NPV investment.20
20In fact, it is also easy to see that this would be the optimal choice if s was veriﬁable and the bank
could, therefore, impose any choice of s∗, regardless of the chosen compensation. In this case, the bank
would also choose w =0and would thus not pay the loan oﬃcer a rent.
11Maximizing (7), we have dΠ/ds∗ =0whenever21
πν(s
∗)g(s
∗)=−
dw
ds∗, (8)
which after substituting from Proposition 1 and using Corollary 1 becomes
πν(s
∗)g(s
∗)=−
D
m
d
ds∗
"
1 − m[1 − p(s∗)]
R 1
s∗ [p(s) − p(s∗)]f(s)ds
#
< 0. (9)
Hence, at the optimally implemented standard s∗ t h er e s p e c t i v e( m a r g i n a l )l o a nr e p r e s e n t s
a negative-NPV investment for the bank: ν(s∗) < 0. The bank optimally chooses s∗ <s FB
as this allows to reduce the internal agency costs.
Proposition 2 The bank’s optimal choice of the lending standard s∗ is given by (9) and
is strictly below the zero-NPV threshold: s∗ <s FB.
Having established the optimal lending standard, we conduct now our key comparative
analysis in the parameter D = c/π. From implicit diﬀerentiation of (9), while using strict
quasiconcavity, we have the following result.
Corollary 2 The optimal lending standard s∗ is strictly decreasing in D.
In words, as it becomes increasingly diﬃcult to generate a new loan-making opportu-
nity, either as π decreases or as c increases, the bank optimally responds by lowering the
lending standard s∗ that the loan oﬃcer subsequently applies. More formally, this result
hinges on the fact that the marginal cost of raising the standard s∗,i . e . ,dw/ds∗ > 0,i s
itself strictly increasing in D:
d2w
ds∗dD
> 0. (10)
Our interpretation of Corollary 2 is in terms of competition in the loan market. We
would argue that more intense competition makes it harder for an individual loan oﬃcer to
generate loan applications. In our model, this can be captured either through an increase
in the cost c or through a reduction in the probability π. Intuitively, we could imagine
that in the extreme case where a bank has a monopoly, most entrepreneurs with a viable
business prospect or most ﬁrms that wish to expand their business will sooner or later end
up anyway at the bank’s doorstep. With intense competition, in particular if rival lenders’
21We suppose here for convenience that the program is strictly quasiconcave.
12loan oﬃcers are themselves actively prospecting for new borrowers, this is no longer the
case.
When extending the model to the case with continuous eﬀort below, we will, in addition,
allow competition to aﬀect not only the overall likelihood with which a loan opportunity
arises, but also the “responsiveness” to changes in eﬀort. As we discuss there, in line with
the standard notion from Industrial Organization theory, competition thus makes loan
demand more elastic to loan oﬃcers’ eﬀort.
Our interpretation of Corollary 2 in terms of competition is agnostic about the reasons
for why competition could increase. As suggested in the Introduction, this could be linked
to deregulation and the opening up of a market to outside competition. Corollary 2
together with Proposition 2 then suggest not only that the average default probability
increases, which in our case is given by
Z 1
s∗
[1 − p(s)]
g(s)
1 − G(s∗)
ds,
but also that more loans are made that represent a negative-NPV investment for the
respective bank. Crucially, however, this is not due to a misperception of risk or herd
behavior. Instead, banks willingly tolerate a lower lending standard when they increase
their loan oﬃcers’ incentives to originate loans.
5 Soft- vs. Hard-Information Lending
I fab a n kd o e sn o th a r n e s sal o a no ﬃcer’s soft information, then the respective loan oﬃcer
faces only a single task, namely that of generating loan applications. Instead, the loan
application process becomes fully automated. In this case, we stipulate that based only
on hard information, the observed signal b s is more noisy. With probability 1 − λ>0 it
is drawn from the uniform distribution over b s ∈ [0,1].T h i ss p e c i ﬁcation ensures that soft
information always adds value. The larger is λ, the less information is lost when basing
the loan approval decision solely on hard information, instead of basing it on both soft
a n dh a r di n f o r m a t i o n .
The posterior probability b μ(b s):=Pr[θ = h | s] is then given by the convex combination
b μ(b s)=λμ(b s)+( 1− λ)μ.W i t h t h e ex-ante success probability p := μph +( 1− μ)pl,w e
have likewise the new conditional success probability b p(b s): =λp(b s)+( 1− λ)p and thus
the conditional NPV b v(b s): =Rb p(b s) − k. Finally, the signal is now distributed according
13to G(b s): =λG(b s)+( 1− λ)b s, where we use that b s ∈ [0,1] is chosen from the uniform
distribution with probability 1 − λ.
The bank optimally approves a loan if b v(b s) ≥ 0.I nc a s eo fa ni n t e r i o ro p t i m a ll e n d i n g
standard b sFB,w et h e nh a v et h a tb v(b sFB)=0 . As the lending standard is now mechanically
imposed by the bank, the loan oﬃcer receives a loan-origination fee of
fH = D
1
1 − G(b sFB)
, (11)
w h i c hj u s tc o m p e n s a t e sh i mf o rt h er e s p e c t i v ec o s to fe ﬀort, and a zero base wage: wH =0 .
(Note that in what follows, it will frequently be convenient to denote some key parameters
by a subscript H if they refer to the hard-information regime and by a subscript S for the
soft-information regime.)
As we explore below, the fact that the loan oﬃcer always realizes a strictly smaller
rent under hard-information lending carries over to the case with continuous eﬀort choice,
though there the bank must leave the loan oﬃcer with positive rent even under hard-
information lending. Moreover, with discrete eﬀort and wH =0it is presently trivial
that the compensation scheme is more high-powered under hard-information lending. We
therefore postpone a comparative analysis of compensation contracts under the two lending
regimes until we deal with the case of continuous eﬀort below.
Note next that the bank’s expected proﬁts under hard-information lending equal
ΠH := π
Z 1
e sFB
b v(s)b g(s)ds − c,
as from an ex-ante perspective the choice of fH in (11) just compensates the loan oﬃcer
for the cost of eﬀort c. With soft-information lending, wage costs are equal to wS + c,
where the base wage under soft-information lending, wS > 0,w a sd e r i v e di nP r o p o s i t i o n
1. Taking this into account, expected proﬁts under soft-information lending equal
ΠS := π
Z 1
s∗
v(s)g(s)ds − D
1
m
"
1 − m[1 − p(s∗)]
R 1
s∗ [p(s) − p(s∗)]f(s)ds
#
− c.
A switch from soft-information lending towards hard-information lending is thus prof-
itable in case ΠH > ΠS. Intuitively, such a shift is less likely the less severe is the agency
problem (and thus the smaller is the agency rent) under soft-information lending. This is
i nt u r nt h ec a s ei fm is higher. Likewise, a shift to hard-information lending is less likely
if this entails a more severe loss in information as represented by a lower value of λ.
14If it is harder to generate a loan application, the bank must under either lending
regime compensate the loan oﬃcer for the additional disutility. Under soft-information
lending, however, the wage bill increases by more than the diﬀerential in eﬀort cost, dc,
as also dwS/dc > 0. Holding ﬁrst s∗ constant, this is the case as an increase in the loan-
origination fee, which is necessary to still incentivize the loan oﬃcer, must be accompanied
by an increase in the base wage wS. Otherwise, the loan oﬃcer would choose to approve
even less promising applicants.
To see more formally how ΠS adjusts relative to ΠH following a marginal increase in
c,n o t et h a tb yt h ee n v e l o p et h e o r e mw eh a v et h a t
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dΠS
dc
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ −
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
dΠH
dc
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ =
∂wS
∂c
=
1
m
1
π
"
1 − m[1 − p(s∗)]
R 1
s∗ [p(s) − p(s∗)]f(s)ds
#
> 0.
Next, though here the formal argument is slightly more complicated, intuitively the
same comparative result applies to the case where π decreases. Overall, we can thus
conclude that if it becomes more diﬃcult to originate a new loan, i.e., if D = c/π increases,
then it is more likely that the hard-information regime is more proﬁtable. The following
Proposition summarizes the comparative results.
Proposition 3 A switch to hard-information lending becomes more likely, i.e., the diﬀer-
ence in the respective proﬁts ΠH − ΠS increases, if:
i) hard-information lending is more informative as λ is higher;
ii) the agency problem under soft-information lending is less severe as m is higher;
iv) or if it becomes harder to generate a new loan-making opportunity as either c increases
or π d e c r e a s e s( r e s u l t i n gi na ni n c r e a s eo fD = c/π).
As we show in the proof of Proposition 3, holding all other parameters ﬁxed, as we
shift either one of the parameters λ, m, c,o rπ, there exists in all cases an interior (and in
t h ec a s eo fc bounded) threshold value for the comparison of proﬁts under the two lending
regimes. Proposition 3 implies that a shift towards a hard-information lending regime, e.g.,
through the adoption of credit scoring, becomes more proﬁtable as competition intensiﬁes,
provided that this leads to a higher value of D. Cross-sectionally one should thus be more
likely to observe the spread of such lending technologies in countries where competition is
15more intense, while otherwise banks may be more likely to still adopt a soft-information
lending regime, with loan oﬃcers playing a vital role in the loan approval decision. Though
we lack comparative studies, it seems that the use of credit scoring has spread extensively
in the United States, at least in the area of small business lending, while this seems to be
much less the case in Europe (cf. the Introduction). Proposition 3 suggests that variations
in competition could provide an explanation.22
6 Continuous Eﬀort Choice
The Modiﬁed Model
Let now the loan oﬃcer choose continuous eﬀort e ≥ 0, which results with probability q(e)
in a new loan-making opportunity and which comes at private cost c(e)=e2/(2γ), where
γ will always be chosen suﬃciently large to ensure that q(e) < 1 holds in equilibrium.
Under soft-information lending, the loan oﬃcer’s signal s is now perfectly informative: He
observes s ∈ {0,1},w h e r es =0is generated with probability one if the borrower is of type
θ = l,w h i l es =1is generated with probability one if θ = h.23 In case of hard-information
lending, the signal is noisy: Type θ = h generates b s =1only with probability 0 <λ<1,
while θ = l generates b s = l with the same probability λ.
We choose for q(e) the linear relationship q(e)=α + βe,w h e r eα ≥ 0 and β>0.I n
the subsequent comparative analysis, an increase in competition is presumed to lead to
al o w e rα or a higher β (or both). Either of the two changes makes loan demand more
elastic to the loan oﬃcer’s eﬀort24. In the working paper version, the linear relationship in
q(e) is derived from ﬁrst principles. There, a "contact" from a loan oﬃcer tilts a borrower
more towards the respective bank as it reduces “transaction costs”, which could comprise,
for instance, the time and eﬀort that is otherwise spent on locating a branch or ﬁnding
out about the prevailing loan terms.25
22That being said, the analysis of Boot and Thakor (2000), which studies the intensity of relationship
loans in the face of increased competition, could also suggest a more diﬀerentiated response of banks to
more competition. Some banks could ﬁnd it more proﬁtable to stick to soft-information lending and to
focus on the clientele that is either locked-in or for which it can provide superior value-added.
23Though ideally we would want both the choice of eﬀort and that of the lending standard to be
continuous, we found that the resulting complexity heavily obfuscates results.
24Recall that elasticity, here with respect to e,i sd e ﬁned as (dq/de)/(e/q).
25As is shown there as well, higher eﬀort from competing loan oﬃcer or better alterna-
tive loan terms both reduce α and increase β. The increase in β, which is less immedi-
ate, follows as the loan oﬃcer’s own eﬀort is only eﬀective if a borrower would otherwise have
16Hard-Information Lending
Given that the ex-ante NPV of a loan is negative, it cannot be optimal for the bank to
approve a borrower after b s =0was revealed. To ensure that approving a loan is optimal
in case of b s =1 , we assume that26
υhμ(1 + λ)+υl(1 − μ)(1 − λ) > 0. (12)
Note that (12) always holds if λ is not too low. Next, the probability with which a loan
will be made is given by
σ :=
1
2
[μ(1 + λ)+( 1− μ)(1 − λ)].
Using in addition that q(e)=α+βe and private costs c(e)=e2/(2γ),t h el o a no ﬃcer will
optimally choose the eﬀort level
e
∗ = fHγβσ. (13)
Here, e∗ is higher if the loan-origination fee is higher (higher fH), if loan demand is more
responsive to eﬀort (higher β), and if the marginal cost of eﬀort is lower (higher γ).
D e n o t en e x tt h eb a n k ’ sw a g ec o s to fi n d u c i n ge ﬀort by CH(e∗), which after substitution
from (13) equals
CH(e
∗)=
e∗
γβ
(α + βe
∗). (14)
Note that with continuous eﬀort the loan oﬃcer now receives a rent even though wH =0
holds.27 Given the expected proﬁts from an approved loan
vEH :=
1
2
[υhμ(1 + λ)+υl(1 − μ)(1 − λ)],
the bank thus chooses the loan-origination fee fH and, thereby, the eﬀort level e∗ from
(13) so as to maximize expected proﬁts: q(e∗)vEH − CH(e∗).
Proposition 4 If
vEH >
α
γβ
2, (15)
chosen a competing oﬀer. The formal analysis can be downloaded at http://www.wiwi.uni-
frankfurt.de/profs/inderst/Corporate_Finance_and_Banking/Cfab_english.htm
26We use for this that the conditional probabilities are Pr(θ = h | b s =1 )=
μ(1+λ)
μ(1+λ)+(1−μ)(1−λ) and
Pr(θ = l | b s =1 )=
(1−μ)(1−λ)
μ(1+λ)+(1−μ)(1−λ).
27Precisely, the bank’s total expected wage costs CH(e∗) in (14) are made up of the true costs of eﬀort
provision, (e∗)2/(2γ), and of a rent equal to (e∗)2/(2γ)+αe∗/(γβ).
17then the optimal incentive scheme under hard-information lending speciﬁes a loan-origination
fee of
fH =
1
2σ
µ
vEH −
α
γβ
2
¶
, (16)
which induces the loan oﬃcer to exert eﬀort
e
∗
H :=
γβ
2
vEH −
α
2β
. (17)
Otherwise, i.e., if (15) does not hold, then fH =0and e∗
H =0 .
Condition (15) deserves some comments. If the loan demand function is insensitive to
eﬀort (low β) or if the marginal cost of eﬀort is high (low γ), e∗
H =0 :T h el o a no ﬃcer then
behaves like a bureaucrat, waiting for potential clients to knock on his door, which happens
with probability α.28 With positive eﬀort, this will be higher under the optimal contract
if a newly made loan is more proﬁtable (higher vEH), if eﬀort is less costly (higher γ), or
if the loan demand function is more elastic (lower α or higher β). As these comparative
results hold invariably under both lending regimes, though, we do not comment on them
in more detail.
Soft-Information Lending
To ensure that the loan is not approved for s =0under soft-information lending, it
must hold that (fS + wS)(1 − m) ≤ wS. As this binds by optimality, we have that
wS = fS
µ
1 − m
m
¶
. (18)
Furthermore, as a loan application is now approved with probability μ,t h el o a no ﬃcer
chooses the eﬀort level
e
∗ = fSγβμ. (19)
Substituting from (18) and (19) into the bank’s expected wage bill, wS + μq(e∗)fS,t h e
total costs from implementing eﬀort e∗ under soft-information lending can be expressed as
CS(e
∗)=CH(e
∗)+
µ
1 − m
m
1
μ
¶
e∗
γβ
. (20)
28Even though we speciﬁed that the true marginal cost of providing eﬀort is zero at e∗ =0 ,g i v e nt h a t
c(e)=e2/(2γ), this follows as the incremental agency rent e∗/γ +α/(γβ) is for α>0 strictly positive for
all e∗.
18The diﬀerence to CE(e∗) captures the rent that arises from the additional task under
soft-information lending. The additional rent is higher the larger is e∗:
dCS(e∗)
de∗ =
dCH(e∗)
de∗ + ρ,w i t hρ :=
1
γβ
1 − m
m
1
μ
. (21)
From maximizing the bank’s objective function q(e∗)vES−CS(e∗),w h e r ew eu s evES := μvh,
we have the following results.
Proposition 5 If
vES >
1
γβ
2
µ
α +
1 − m
m
1
μ
¶
, (22)
then the optimal incentive scheme under soft-information lending induces the loan oﬃcer
to exert eﬀort
e
∗
S :=
γβ
2
vES −
α
2β
−
1
2β
µ
1 − m
m
1
μ
¶
, (23)
where fS = e∗
S/(γβμ) and
wS = e
∗
S
1
γβμ
µ
1 − m
m
¶
. (24)
Otherwise, i.e., if (22) does not hold, then wS = fS = e∗
S =0 .
Soft- vs. Hard-Information Lending
Soft-information lending is more informative, as expressed formally by the higher ex-
pected value of a new loan-making opportunity, vES >v EH,b u tc o m e sa th i g h e rw a g e
costs (cf. (20)). Importantly, from (21) the cost diﬀerence vis-a-vis hard-information lend-
ing increases with the level of induced eﬀort, while higher eﬀo r ti si nt u r no p t i m a lw h e n
the loan-demand function q(e) is more elastic (cf. both Propositions 4 and 5). The eﬀect
of a reduction in α mirrors our previous analysis for the case with discrete eﬀort. What
is new, an increase in β, which makes eliciting more eﬀort more proﬁtable, has the same
eﬀect.
Proposition 6 Hard-information lending becomes relatively more proﬁtable as the loan-
demand function becomes more elastic to the loan oﬃcer’s eﬀort, i.e., as either α decreases
or β increases.
Our ﬁnal observations relate to the steepness of the loan oﬃcer’s incentive scheme and
to the, thereby, implemented level of eﬀort, which proxies for the “aggressiveness” with
which loan oﬃcers will operate in the market.
19Corollary 3 If competition increases (lower α or higher β), then the compensation scheme
becomes steeper as the bank optimally induces a higher level of eﬀort from the loan oﬃcer.
This holds, in particular, at the point where the bank optimally switches to hard-information
lending. In this case, we would observe a notable (discrete) increase in loan oﬃcers’
incentives and their induced (sales) eﬀort.
7 Discussion and Further Extensions
7.1 Investment in the Loan Review Process
In the preceding analysis, the intensity of the loan-review process, m,w a st a k e nt ob e
exogenously given, leaving only the compensation scheme (w,f) as a strategic variable
to inﬂuence the loan oﬃcer. As noted in the Introduction, however, banks also choose
strategically the extent to which they scrutinize internal ratings and past loan-making
decisions. To capture this, suppose that the bank can choose the probability m at strictly
increasing cost Φ(m). From Proposition 1 the bank’s cost of incentivizing the loan oﬃcer
and implementing a credit standard s∗ under soft-information lending is then equal to
K(s
∗): =m i n
m {Φ(m)+w}, (25)
where w is given by (5). Note that as w is strictly convex in m, provided that Φ is also
convex the program in (25) yields a unique outcome. For Φ(m)=φm we have explicitly,
provided that this is interior, the optimal monitoring level
m
∗ =
s
D
1
φ
1
R 1
s∗ [p(s) − p(s∗)]f(s)ds
. (26)
After substitution to obtain K(s∗) from (25), note that
dK(s∗)
ds∗ > 0 and, in particular, that
still
d2K(s∗)
ds∗dD > 0.
To complete the picture, we specify that under hard-information lending, where there
is no (strategic) reason for the bank to review loans beyond what is required by regulation,
the bank must monitor at some minimum level m = m ≥ 0. For the following analysis, we
choose m and φ so as to ensure that under the optimal standard s∗ for soft-information
lending it holds that m <m ∗ < 1. From the preceding observations, together with a
comparative analysis of (26), we have the following results.
20Proposition 7 Suppose that the loan-review intensity, m, can be chosen at cost Φ(m)=
φm. Then all previous comparative statics results (of the optimal lending standard and
the switch to hard-information lending) still hold. In addition, an increase in D now leads
both to higher pay w and to more monitoring m under soft-information lending, albeit the
standard s∗ still decreases.
7.2 Loan Selling
As noted in the Introduction, the key application of the present model is to commercial
lending. In particular, the model does not intend to capture speciﬁcf e a t u r e so fr e t a i l
lending, especially in the mortgage industry. One such feature is that originating insti-
tutions rarely hold on to mortgages. The practice of re-selling loans has, however, also
spread increasingly into commercial lending, in particular with respect to SME lending.
The packaging and selling-on of loans is facilitated under hard-information lending, given
that this makes individual loans more comparable and the whole process more transparent.
Hard-information lending may thus be seen as being conducive to the spread of loan sales.
Our model supports, however, the reverse causality: If a larger fraction of loans can be
sold oﬀ, e.g., as a liquid market develops, this makes hard-information lending relatively
more proﬁtable, even absent any direct (cost) savings from it.
Suppose thus that a given loan is sold oﬀ with probability ψ and at "price" p,w h i c h
will be endogenized subsequently. To keep expressions short, we take the price to be
net of the original capital outlay. If under soft-information lending a loan is approved
after the loan oﬃcer observed some signal s, then the bank’s expected payoﬀ is now
vsell(s)=( 1−ψ)v(s)+ψp.A sψ does not aﬀect w, as characterized in (5), for given p the
ﬁrst-order condition for the lending standard s∗ becomes in analogy to (8)
πvsell(s)g(s
∗)=−
dw
ds∗. (27)
To characterize the equilibrium, p has still to be endogenized. For given s∗, a competitive
market will pay the expected NPV: p = E[v(s) | s ≥ s∗]. As the bank’s chosen standard is
not observable, the applicable equilibrium concept is that of a rational-expectations equi-
librium: The ﬁrst-order condition (27) as well as the market’s expectations, as expressed
in the requirement that p = E[v(s) | s ≥ s∗],m u s tb ej o i n t l ys a t i s ﬁed.
21Proposition 8 If a loan is resold with probability ψ under soft-information lending, then
there is a unique rational-expectations equilibrium. The applied lending standard and the
price p that the market pays are strictly lower the higher is ψ. Absent direct beneﬁts from
reselling, the bank’s expected proﬁts are strictly lower the higher is ψ.
Recall that at ψ =0the bank’s "marginal loan" (at s = s∗) has negative NPV, which
follows from the fact that raising s∗ is costly: dw/ds∗ > 0. When a loan will be resold
with positive probability, then the bank cares more about earning the ﬁxed price p and less
about the loan’s true NPV. In addition, the bank has less incentives to spend additional
resources to sustain internally a higher lending standard (i.e., through a higher w or, as in
Section 7.1, through higher monitoring costs Φ(m)). As the market, however, rationally
anticipates the bank’s behavior, the bank’s proﬁts are strictly lower.29
With hard-information lending, we presume that the respective information—or, like-
wise, the process through which information is gathered and approval decisions are made—is
veriﬁable: The loan oﬃcer is left with no discretion, implying that the (unobservable) in-
ternal compensation scheme has no inﬂuence on the quality of loans.30 As is immediate
to show, this implies that the bank optimally chooses the same standard regardless of ψ
(namely, b sFB such that b v(b sFB)=0 ). Given that we abstracted from direct beneﬁts of re-
selling loans, the bank’s proﬁt sa r et h u sn o ta ﬀected by ψ under hard-information lending.
Together with Proposition 8, we thus have the following result.
Corollary 4 As ψ increases, hard-information lending becomes relatively more proﬁtable
compared to soft-information lending.
In contrast to our analysis in the previous sections, what drives Corollary 4 is thus
the agency problem between the bank and the market under soft-information lending.
However, this agency problem becomes aggravated by the bank’s internal agency problem
vis-á-vis loan oﬃcers as from dw/ds∗ > 0 the bank has less incentives to sustain its internal
standard.
29Admittedly, recent observations in the subprime mortgage markets indicate a lack of "anticipation"
or, at least, "awareness". With such a (short-term) behavior, the market may then set p = E[v(s) | s ≥ s∗]
at the standard s∗ that is chosen for ψ =0 , inducing a further reduction of the "true" standard.
30In practice, this may typically not hold in this clear-cut way. For instance, not all information that
is hard and veriﬁable will be actually veriﬁed, both by the bank and by those who purchase the loans (or
rate the underlying risk). In particular, loan oﬃcers may then be tempted to "collude" with borrowers
(cf. the Introduction).
227.3 Contracting and Employment Relationship
In the present model, the bank ensures, through the loan review process and through
paying a rent w>0, that the loan oﬃcer not only generates new loan applications, but
also adheres to the bank’s lending standard. Paying a high rent may, however, involve
not only "direct costs" (of w), but also "indirect costs" in terms of the pool of attracted
applicants. This is the case as any successful applicant can earn w irrespective of whether
he actually has the skills to generate new loans. In this Section, we suppose that this
("lemons") problem is suﬃciently severe such that the bank is forced to compensate agents
only based on originated loans, namely through the fee f. To ensure compliance to the
chosen lending standard, the bank must now rely on repeated interaction.
Precisely, for the limited purpose of this section we restrict attention to the following
setting. In a stationary environment, all parties use the same discount factor 0 <δ<1.
The relationship between a given loan oﬃcer and the bank is severed with probability
0 ≤ 1−ϕ<1 in each period. We comment on this additional exogenous variable below. If
no loan was made, the loan oﬃcer now receives zero compensation and is retained (unless
the relationship is severed exogenously with probability ϕ). If a loan was made, the loan
oﬃcer earns the fee f. If subsequent monitoring reveals θ = l,t h el o a no ﬃcer is removed
from his position, either by ﬁring him or by employing him in a (back-oﬃce) position
where he no longer earns fees (but instead only his market wage, which we normalized to
zero).31
The key restriction in this incentive scheme, apart from requiring that w =0 ,i s
that payments to the loan oﬃcer cannot condition on performance in earlier periods.
It is well known that through multi-period interactions the agency problem arising from
moral hazard could be mitigated through such compensation schemes, though this requires
commitment by the principal.32 If the outcome of the loan review process is only privately
observed, the principal, i.e., the bank in the present setting, may opportunistically deny
the loan oﬃcer compensation for past performance. In contrast, this is not the case in
t h ec h o s e ni n c e n t i v es c h e m e ,g i v e nt h a te a c hp e r i o dt h ef e ei sp a i du p - f r o n to n c eal o a n
31It is straightforward to extend the analysis to the case where also the fraction 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 of the fee
can be clawed back if the loan oﬃcer is replaced.
32In general, multi-period interactions allow both to ﬁlter out noise from the agent’s performance and to
alleviate his limited liability constraint (namely, through using past compensation as a "bond" for future
performance). For an early and seminal contribution to this vast literature see Radner (1985).
23w a sm a d ea n dc a nn o tb ec l a w e db a c k .I na d d i t i o n ,a sw ea s s u m et h a tﬁnding an equally
capable replacement comes at zero cost to the bank, there is also no commitment problem
when it comes to punishing the loan oﬃcer.
We frame the analysis in the model of Section 6. For brevity, set also α =0such
that q(e)=βe. Denote next by U the loan oﬃcer’s stationary continuation payoﬀ at the
beginning of each period. Provided that he only approves a loan when s =1 ,t h e nw i t h
u := maxe{q(e)μf − c(e)} we have
U =
u
1 − δϕ
. (28)
To ensure that loans are only approved if s =1 ,i tm u s th o l dt h a t
f ≤
δϕ
1 − δϕ
mU, (29)
w h e r ew eu s e dt h a ts =0and thus θ = l is detected with probability m. Substituting (28)
into (29) and using also that e∗ = γβμf,w eh a v et h er e q u i r e m e n tt h a t
f ≥ 2
1 − δϕ
δϕ
1
γμ2β
2m
. (30)
Interestingly, to ensure compliance of the loan oﬃcer to the bank’s lending standard
(i.e., s =1 ), the fee f must now be suﬃciently high.T h i sa tﬁrst counterintuitive result
follows from the following observations. An increase in f not only aﬀects the left-hand side
o ft h er e s p e c t i v ec o n s t r a i n t( 2 9 ) ,b u ti ta l s oa ﬀects the right-hand side through an increase
in U.I fw ew e r et oh o l dt h eo ﬃcer’s eﬀort level constant when increasing f, U would also
increase proportionally with f.A s t h e l o a no ﬃcer, however, optimally adjusts his eﬀort
level, U increases more than proportionally with f (namely quadratic in the present case).
The stronger indirect eﬀect is then reﬂected in the lower threshold for f in (30).
Before commenting further on this threshold, consider the bank’s optimal choice of f,
which maximizes per-period proﬁts π := q(e)[vh − f]. This yields f∗ := vh/2,w h i c hf r o m
(30) is thus only feasible if
1 − δϕ
δϕ
≤
vh
4
¡
γμ
2β
2m
¢
. (31)
Otherwise, i.e., if (31) does not hold, the bank must increase the fee above the level that
is optimal, so as to ensure that the loan oﬃcer’s continuation value, U,i ss u ﬃciently high.
We assume now γμβvh < 1, which ensures that even at f = vh, which would deprive the
bank of all proﬁts, the resulting eﬀort level e∗ is interior. The following result is then
immediate from the previous observations.
24Proposition 9 Take the model with repeated interaction, where only an up-front fee f for
each new loan is contractible. If (31) holds, the bank can implement the optimal fee level
and thus also the optimal eﬀort level under soft-information lending. If instead
vh
4
¡
γμ
2β
2m
¢
<
1 − δϕ
δϕ
≤
vh
2
¡
γμ
2β
2m
¢
(32)
holds, the bank must pay a strictly higher fee, leading to a higher eﬀort level but lower
proﬁts for the bank. Finally, if
1 − δϕ
δϕ
>
vh
2
¡
γμ
2β
2m
¢
(33)
holds, then it is not feasible for the bank to realize positive proﬁts while ensuring that the
loan oﬃcer uses his soft information in the bank’s interest.
We want to interpret the results of Proposition 9 in terms of changes in 1 − ϕ,t h e
probability with which the employment relationship is severed exogenously in each period.
As it becomes increasingly likely that the employment relationship will end, it is from (33)
no longer feasible at all to sustain the soft-information lending regime. While for higher
levels of ϕ,t o g e t h e rw i t hs u ﬃciently high levels of δ, the bank can make positive proﬁts
under soft-information lending, proﬁts are compromised as it must choose the fee and thus
the implemented eﬀort above the second-best level. Even though ϕ does not directly enter
proﬁts, given that the bank can replace a loan oﬃcer at no additional costs, in this case its
proﬁts are strictly increasing in ϕ. Finally, for high levels of ϕ, together with suﬃciently
high levels of δ, the bank can achieve the second-best outcome under soft-information
lending.33
A cautious interpretation of ϕ could be in terms of the bank’s internal employment re-
lationship. Though this is admittedly outside the model, in particular given the considered
stationary environment, ϕ could measure the extent to which the bank buﬀers internally
shocks in the demand for loans. While we cannot present even stylized empirical results,
judging by the job description of the US Department of Labor (cf. footnote 10) commercial
loan oﬃcers in the US not only face substantial ﬂuctuations in earnings over the business
cycle but also substantial risk of losing their job in downturns. Arguably, this is much
33With a continuous lending standard s∗, albeit in this case with only discrete eﬀort due to tractability, it
can be shown that an increase in ϕ has two eﬀects. First, it increases the maximum lending standard that
the bank can implement. Second, if the bank’s optimal lending standard is strictly below this threshold,
then it strictly increases in ϕ.
25less the case in other countries, where any job with a large bank may be considered to
be particularly safe and where employment relationships are long term.34 Proposition 9
would suggest that in the latter environment banks can make better use of loan oﬃcers’
soft information and pay lower fees.
Unfortunately, we are not aware of any research conducting cross-country comparisons
in loan oﬃcers’ pay and employment conditions. Proposition 9, as well as the preceding
results in the present paper, suggest that such data may be of importance also in order to
understand the borrowing conditions faced by commercial lenders, i.e., how banks make
their approval decisions and what lending standard they apply
8C o n c l u s i o n
At the heart of this paper is a novel model of the loan-origination process. Under soft-
information lending, the loan oﬃcer performs two tasks, namely that of originating new
loan applications and that of using his soft information at the loan-approval stage. A
ﬁrst set of results analyzes the implications for the optimal lending standard that the
bank wants to implement. In particular, we ﬁnd that as competition makes it harder to
originate new loans, the bank chooses a lower lending standard. This may also help to
explain why lending standards are (excessively) countercyclical. Furthermore, under the
chosen lending standard even negative-NPV loans are made, in particular if competition
is more intense. As we stressed above, this is optimal as it serves to mitigate the agency
problem vis-á-vis the bank’s loan oﬃcers. In particular, in our model this does not follow
from excessively high leverage.
A further set of implications relate to loan oﬃcers’ incentive schemes and the interaction
with the banks’ internal loan review process. Our model suggests that loan oﬃcers tend
to be paid more like salespeople and less like bureaucrats as competition intensiﬁes and,
in particular, as the bank switches from a soft- to a hard-information lending regime.
In the latter case, the loan oﬃcer’s task becomes one-dimensional as he no longer has
authority at the loan approval stage. Such a switch to hard-information lending, e.g.,
through the adoption of credit scoring, is again more likely as competition increases. This
observation complements the role of other factors such as the cost of adopting credit scoring
34Germany could come to mind here, although this must again remain only a casual observation.
26or the value of the thereby generated information. Moreover, it provides a contrasting
perspective to the alternative view that competition intensiﬁes through the adoption of
credit scoring, given that it allows more distant lenders to enter an incumbent bank’s local
turf. As we noted above, the adoption of credit scoring and more competition can thus
be complementary developments, which are mutually reinforcing. This may explain also
large cross-country diﬀerences.
In several extension the simple model of the bank’s internal agency problem vis-á-
vis its loan oﬃcers was used, amongst other things, to shed light on how the switch to
hard-information lending may also be driven by other factors, such as the possibility of
loan sales or banks’ internal employment relationship. Again, both factors may help to
explain cross-country diﬀerences. As we agued, stable and more long-term employment
relationships may be conducive to soft-information lending, while the access to a liquid
market for the sale of commercial loans may trigger a switch to hard-information lending.
Appendix: Proofs
P r o o fo fC o r o l l a r y2 . Implicit diﬀerentiation of (9) yields
ds∗
dD
= −
µ
−d2w/(ds∗dD)
d2Π/d(s∗)2
¶
,
where we can substitute d2Π/d(s∗)2 < 0 as well as
d2w
ds∗dD
=
1
m
d
ds∗
"
1 − m[1 − p(s∗)]
R 1
s∗ [p(s) − p(s∗)]f(s)ds
#
> 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. We take ﬁrst the comparative statics in λ. Existence of an
interior threshold λ
0 such that hard-information lending is optimal for λ>λ
0 and soft-
information lending for λ<λ
0 follows from strict monotonicity of ΠH,f r o mΠH > ΠS for
λ =1 ,a n df r o mΠH < 0 for all suﬃciently low λ.
For the case of m note next that ΠS is continuous and strictly increasing in m given
that monotonicity holds also for w.M o r e o v e r ,f o r m =1we have s∗ = sFB and w =0 ,
implying ΠS > ΠH, while as m → 0 we clearly have for any s∗ bounded away from zero
that ΠS must become negative given that w →∞ . This together implies again existence
of an interior threshold for m.
27We have further ΠS > ΠH for c =0given that then w =0and s∗ = sFB.O nt h eo t h e r
side, as long as s∗ remains bounded away from zero we have w →∞as c →∞ .T o g e t h e r
with strict monotonicity of ΠH −ΠS, this implies existence of a bounded threshold c0 > 0.
Take ﬁnally π. Using the envelope theorem, we have that
d(ΠH − ΠS)
dπ
=
∙Z 1
e sFB
b v(s)b g(s)ds −
Z 1
s∗
v(s)g(s)ds
¸
+
1
π
w
=
1
π
[ΠH − ΠS].
This implies monotonicity on either side of a threshold 0 <π 0 < 1 at which ΠH = ΠS.
Such an interior threshold π0 exists if ΠS > ΠH holds at π =1 . Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 4 and 5. Substituting for CH(e∗) into the proﬁt function
q(e∗)vEH − CH(e∗), we can observe that this is strictly quasiconcave in e∗.T h e c h a r -
acterization of e∗
H follows then from the ﬁrst-order condition in case (15) applies. This can
also be substituted back to obtain proﬁts of
ΠH =
1
γβ
2q
2(e
∗
H)=
(α + βe∗
H)2
γβ
2 . (34)
Proceeding likewise for the case of soft-information lending, we obtain for e∗
S > 0 proﬁts
of
ΠS =
1
γβ
2
∙
q
2(e
∗
S)+α
µ
1 − m
m
1
μ
¶¸
=
1
γβ
2
∙
(α + βe∗
S)2
γβ
2 + α
µ
1 − m
m
1
μ
¶¸
. (35)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Propositions 6.W e c o n s i d e r ﬁrst a comparative analysis of the diﬀerence
ΠH − ΠS in β. We have from (34) and (35) that
ΠH − ΠS =
1
γβ
2
∙
q
2(e
∗
H) − q
2(e
∗
S) − α
µ
1 − m
m
1
μ
¶¸
. (36)
W ea r g u et h a tw h e n e v e rβ is such that ΠH = ΠS, then at this point we must always have
that
d
dβ
(ΠH − ΠS) > 0. (37)
From the envelope theorem we have that
d
dβ
(ΠH − ΠS)=−
2
γβ
3
∙
q
2(e
∗
H) − q
2(e
∗
S)+α
µ
1 − m
m
1
μ
¶¸
(38)
+
1
γβ
2 [q(e
∗
H)e
∗
H − q(e
∗
S)e
∗
S].
28At ΠH = ΠS,t h eﬁrst term in (38) is zero, implying that at this point the sign is determined
by the second term and is thus strictly positive in case e∗
H >e ∗
S. This, i.e., that e∗
H >e ∗
S,
follows ﬁnally from ΠH = ΠS while using (34) and (35).
Observe next that for low β,w h e r ee∗
H = e∗
S =0 ,i th o l d st h a tΠH < ΠS. (Precisely,
this is the case if both β ≤
q
α
γvEH and β ≤
r
α+1−m
m
1
μ
γvEH .) Using ﬁnally continuity of ΠH
and ΠS,w eh a v et h u ss h o w nt h a to n eo ft h ef o l l o w i n gc a s e sm u s ta p p l ya sw ei n c r e a s eβ:
either ΠH < ΠS holds for all feasible values β ≥ 0 or ΠH < ΠS holds for 0 ≤ β<β
0 and
ΠH > ΠS for β>β
0.35
Take next changes in α, where the argument is analogous. Diﬀerentiating ΠH −ΠS at
ΠH − ΠS =0 , the sign is strictly negative whenever
2q(e
∗
H) − 2q(e
∗
S) −
µ
1 − m
m
1
μ
¶
< 0. (39)
As in addition ΠH − ΠS holds if
q
2(e
∗
H) − q
2(e
∗
S)=α
µ
1 − m
m
1
μ
¶
,
condition (39) holds if 2α<q (e∗
H)+q(e∗
S),w h i c hf r o me∗
H ≥ e∗
S ﬁnally holds (and also
strictly if e∗
H > 0). Q.E.D.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n8 .Note that p = E[v(s) | s ≥ s∗] generates a strictly increasing
function p of s∗, while with strict quasiconcavity of the bank’s objective function we
obtain from (27) a strictly decreasing function s∗ of p. These observations together ensure
uniqueness. Note now that vsell >v (s∗). For a comparative analysis in ψ, observe that
this does not aﬀect the determination of p, for given s∗, but only (27). From implicit
diﬀerentiation, we have that, for given p,a ni n c r e a s ei nψ leads to a lower s∗,g i v e nt h a t
vsell >v (s∗).F r o mt h i sw eh a v eﬁnally that in equilibrium both p and s∗ are decreasing
in ψ. Q.E.D.
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